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Summary
The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army’s multiyear, multibillion-
dollar program at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts.  It is to be the
Army’s major research, development, and acquisition program to consist of 18
manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications
network.  FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1 Abrams tank
and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle with advanced, networked combat
systems.  The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-
risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved as well as the challenge of
networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units can
function as intended. 
The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which
could significantly influence the program’s progress.  The wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, proposed and possible defense budget cuts, and the upcoming
Quadrennial Defense Review will each likely play a role in shaping the FCS
program.  The revised FCS program timeline — including four “spirals” whereby
equipment is to be tested first by a FCS evaluation brigade and then introduced into
the current force — has extended the program’s timeline by four years and has added
additional funding requirements, but it has also served to reduce some of the risk
associated with this admittedly high-risk venture. 
The overall FCS program budget has risen steadily since the program’s
inception and because the program is still in its early stages, its full costs are not yet
known. The FCS program is managed by a lead systems integrator group consisting
of major defense contractors Boeing and Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC). Although widely criticized, the Army adopted this program
management approach largely because it did not have enough acquisition, scientific,
and engineering staff to manage a program of this complexity and scope. In addition
the program’s use of an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreement in lieu of a
more structured Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract raised a number of
concerns regarding program oversight and protecting the taxpayer’s interests. Partly
due to Congressional pressure, the Army recently decided to change from an OTA
to a more traditional contract, although specific details at this point are few.
The FCS is experiencing a number of program development issues in its Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program as well as in the manned and unmanned
ground vehicle programs.  Congress, in its authorization, appropriation, and oversight
roles may wish to review the relevancy of the FCS program in terms of current and
potential future threats, the overall viability of the program, program management
and contractual agreements, and program “off ramps” into the current force should
the FCS program be modified or curtailed.  This report will be updated as the
situation warrants.
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The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
Background and Issues for Congress
Issues for Congress
The Future Combat System (FCS) is the Army’s multiyear, multibillion-dollar
program which is considered to be at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts.
It is to be the Army’s major research, development, and acquisition program to
consist of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive
communications network.  FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-
1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle with advanced
networked combat systems. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army
and others as a high-risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved as well
as the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-
equipped units can function as intended. 
The primary issues presented to Congress are the necessity and viability of the
FCS program and the likelihood, given a myriad of factors, that the Army will able
to field its first FCS-equipped brigade by 2014 and eventually field up to 15 FCS-
equipped brigades. Key oversight questions for consideration include 
! Is the FCS relevant to current and future security challenges?
! Is the FCS program, as currently envisioned, viable?
! Are FCS program management and types of contractual agreements
appropriate?
! How will program “Off Ramps” and integration into the current
force be managed?
Congress’s decisions on these and other related issues could have significant
implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and future
congressional oversight activities. This report will address a variety of issues
including the program’s timeline, budget, program systems and subsystems, as well
as current program developmental issues and challenges.
Background
FCS Program Origins
In October 1999, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki
introduced the Army’s transformation strategy which was intended to convert all of
the Army’s divisions (called Legacy Forces) into new organizations called the
CRS-2
1 Many experts consider the Army’s 1999 controversial Task Force (TF) Hawk deployment
to Kosovo and Albania as the event that triggered the Army’s transformation. Reportedly,
the Army deployed a unit consisting of units from different divisions that had never trained
together commanded by a command and control organization that was unable to conduct
joint operations. The most often cited criticism was that it took  more than 30 days to deploy
TF Hawk, centered on 28 Apache attack helicopters, from bases in Germany to Albania;
and, when they finally arrived, they were unable to conduct combat operations due to
training and equipment deficiencies. The task force also consisted of mechanized maneuver
and support elements competing for limited air lift insertion capabilities.
2 According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States
Army,” dated June 14, 1994, a brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers and
a division consists of approximately 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers.
3 Frank Tiboni, “Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation,” Federal
Computer Week, Feb. 9, 2004.
4 James Jay Carafano, “The Army Goes Rolling Along: New Service Transformation
Agenda Suggests Promise and Problems,” Heritage Foundation, Feb. 23, 2004, p. 5. 
5 Bruce R. Nardulli and Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army: Toward the Objective Force,”
in Hans Binnendijk, ed. Transforming America’s Military, (National Defense University
Press, 2002), p. 106.
6 The Army currently plans to field five active and one National Guard Interim Brigade
Combat Teams.
7  The Stryker is the Army’s name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles which will
constitute most of the brigade’s combat and combat support vehicles.
8 “Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” GlobalSecurity.org, updated May 19, 2004,
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm]. 
Objective Force.1  General Shinseki’s intent was to make the Army lighter, more
modular, and — most importantly — more deployable. General Shinseki’s
deployment goals were to deploy a brigade2 in four days, a division in five days, and
five divisions in 30 days.3  As part of this transformation, the Army adopted the
Future Combat System (FCS) as a major acquisition program to equip the Objective
Force.4
This transformation, due to its complexity and uncertainty, was scheduled to
take place over the course of three decades, with the first FCS-equipped objective
force unit reportedly becoming operational in 2011 and the entire force transformed
by 2032.5  In order to mitigate the risk associated with the Objective Force and to
address the near-term need for more deployable and capable units, the Army’s
transformation plan called for the development of brigade-sized units called the
Interim Force in both the active Army and the Army National Guard.  These six
brigade sized units,6  known as both Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) or
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams7 (SBCTs), are currently being fielded and some have
served  in Iraq — with the last brigade due to be  fielded in 2010.8
General Shinseki’s vision for the FCS was that it would consist of smaller and
lighter ground and air vehicles — manned, unmanned, and robotic — , and would
employ advanced offensive, defensive, and communications/information systems to
CRS-3
9 The following description of the early stages of the FCS program is taken from Frank
Tiboni’s Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation.
10 The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the Defense Department’s senior-level forum
for advising the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)) on critical decisions concerning DAB-managed programs and special interest
programs.
11 James Jay Carafano, p. 6.
12 Ibid.
“outsmart and outmaneuver heavier enemy forces on the battlefield.”9  In order to
initiate the FCS program, General Shinseki turned to the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), not only because of their proven ability to manage highly
conceptual and scientifically challenging projects, but also because he reportedly felt
that he would receive a great deal of opposition from senior Army leaders who
advocated heavier and more powerful vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the
M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.  In May 2000, DARPA awarded four contracts
to four industry teams to develop FCS designs and in March 2002, the Army chose
Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to serve as the
lead systems integrators to oversee the development and eventual production of the
FCS’ 18 systems.  On May 14, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board10 (DAB)
approved the FCS’ next acquisition phase and in August 2004 Boeing and SAIC
awarded contracts to 21 companies to design and build its various platforms and
hardware and software.
In August 2003, the newly designated CSA, General Peter Schoomaker, changed
the Army’s transformation plan.  General Schoomaker redesignated the Objective
Force as the Future Force, emphasizing the fielding of useful FCS program
capabilities as soon as they became available instead of waiting a decade or more
before they could be integrated into other FCS platforms and technologies under
development.11  Some suggest that this was an attempt to deploy relevant
technologies to forces actively involved in combat operations as opposed to the
abandonment of General Shinseki’s transformation program. Under General
Schoomaker’s plan, the Army  restructured the FCS program to place the emphasis
more on the various networks linking Army forces together, as well as with units
from the other services, than on the actual FCS platforms themselves.12
FCS and the National Security Environment
The FCS, like all other major, multi-year defense programs, is subject to the
changing demands of the national security environment.  No matter how successful
the FCS is on a programmatic level, whether or not the Army eventually achieves its
15-brigade FCS force is highly dependent on the influences of the current and future
national security environment. 
The Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . In 1999, a peacetime Army introduced
the FCS program as the centerpiece of its transformation plan. At that time, the Army
CRS-4
13 Megan Scully, Christopher P. Cavas, Laura M. Colarusso, Jason Sherman, “Top Defense
Programs: How Secure are they as Pentagon Budgets Tighten?” Armed Forces Journal, Dec.
2004, p. 27.
14 See CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress for a
detailed examination of the Army’s restructuring efforts.
15 See CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United
States?
16 P.L. 108-375, Sec. 401-403.
17 Megan Scully, “Analysts: U.S. Soldier Boost Could Cut Material,” Defense News, June
28, 2004.
18 Ibid.
19 Loren B. Thompson, “QDR Targets Weapons Programs; FCS, JSF Likely Hit,” Defense
Today, Dec. 10, 2004.
20  Rowan Scarborough, “Pentagon Cost-Cutting Aimed at New Gear,” Washington Times,
Dec. 20, 2004 and Jason Sherman,”Pentagon Slashes $30 Billion from Major Navy, Air
(continued...)
reportedly planned on “a few more years of relative tranquility to pay for the FCS”13
Most agree that the wars in Afghanistan and, particularly, Iraq have significantly
altered this expectation, resulting in not only a shift of the Army’s focus to dealing
with the day-to-day challenges of fighting a multi-front war, but also a total
restructuring of the Army’s combat forces.  In what the Army describes as the “most
significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years,” the Army is redesigning its
current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA
force by FY2007.14
The wars have also resulted in a congressionally-mandated end-strength increase
for the Army.15  Under the provisions of PL 108-375, the Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2005, the active Army’s current authorized end-
strength of 482,400 soldiers will grow by 20,000 by the end of 2005. The act
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to increase it by 10,000 more in FY 05-09.16  The
Army’s primary concern is how to pay for these 30,000 soldiers in the future since
Congress used supplemental appropriation funds to pay for initial  end-strength
increases. The Army reportedly estimates that it will cost $3.6 billion dollars annually
in pay and benefits for the additional soldiers while the Congressional Budget Office
reportedly puts the figure at about $2.6 billion annually.17  Some experts, who assume
that the Army’s budget will not increase permanently to support the end-strength
increase, suggest that these end-strength related costs will be borne in part by the
Army’s  procurement account  and suggest that FCS procurement funds are “the
biggest target” to pay for these end-strength increases.18  In addition to paying for
end-strength increases, some analysts believe that FCS program funds might also be
used to pay for rising operational and maintenance costs, particularly if the Iraq war
continues at this or at a greater pace over the next five to ten years.19
Defense Budget Cuts.  The Department of Defense (DOD) has reportedly
been asked by the Administration, as part of its deficit reduction campaign, to reduce
its spending plans over the next six years by $30 billion.20  These budget cuts are
CRS-5
20 (...continued)
Force, Missile Defense Programs,” InsideDefense.com, January 2, 2005.  
21 For further information on modularity, see CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular
Redesign: Issues for Congress.  The Army describes modularity as the “most significant
Army restructuring in the past 50 years,” whereby the Army intends to redesign its current
10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA force by
FY2007. Figures cited here are from an unofficial version of DOD’s Program Budget
Decision (PBD) 753, Dec. 23, 2004, from the Navy Times, [http://www.navytimes.
com/content/editorial/pdf/dn.pbd753.pdf].  See p. 1 for the $5 billion figure.
22 The Defense Authorization Act for FY1997 (P.L. 105-85) established the QDR, but only
as a one time requirement.  Congress established the QDR as a permanent recurring
requirement (10 U.S. Code, 118) in the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2000.
23 Keith J. Costa, “Review Expected to Consider Unconventional Threats - Zakheim: QDR
Could Alter Investment Patterns for Air, Land Forces,” Inside the Pentagon, Dec. 9, 2004,
p. 1.
24 Dave Ahearn, “Defense Review May Help Decide Which Programs Thrive: Analysts,”
Defense Today, Dec. 6, 2004, p. 2.
supposedly outlined in DOD’s Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753 dated
December 23, 2004, that was obtained by the press.  These cuts will not affect
personnel and operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts but will come instead
from procurement accounts.  While Navy and Air Force programs are being subjected
to a variety of cuts, the Army will receive an additional $5 billion a year for the
Army’s modularity program.21  Many observers believe that this not only marks the
end of an almost decade-long military build up but sets the stage for future  budget
cuts which could not only help to reduce the deficit  but also to fund non-military
programs such as homeland security. Some are questioning if the FCS program can
survive in such an environment. While the first round of budget cuts fell almost
exclusively on DOD, Navy, and Air Force programs, at some point in the future, the
Army may be asked to contribute its “fair share.”
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  The QDR is the Administration’s
statement on defense strategy, programs, and spending and is published every four
years and submitted to Congress no later than the date on which the President
submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress.22  The FY2005 QDR is
scheduled to be submitted to Congress in early November 2005 and, according to a
number of reports, may have implications for the FCS program.
According to one report, the 2005 QDR is expected to emphasize
unconventional and asymmetric threats which could result in “major changes in
investment patterns for the military, particularly with respect to air and land forces.”23
Analysts also suggest that the 2005 QDR will need to confront the issue that “the
Army is simply too small to perform all the missions assigned to it.” 24  Most agree
that funds needed to address QDR initiatives will likely come through cuts in the
Service’s procurement programs. Some, however, believe that FCS “is less likely
than other major weapons systems programs to be targeted during the QDR because
CRS-6
25 Anne Plummer, “QDR Expected to Impact Major Programs: Services Offer Pentagon
Suggestions on How to Focus Upcoming QDR,” Inside the Army, Dec. 20, 2004, p. 10.
26 Ibid.
27 Information in this section is taken from the Army’s official FCS website
[http://www.army.mil/fcs/factfiles/overview.html].
28 According to Army Pamphlet 10-1, Organization of the United States Army, 1994, a
battalion/squadron (an equivalent sized cavalry organization) consists of from 300 to 1,000
soldiers and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, a company, battery (an equivalent sized
artillery organization), or troop (an equivalent sized cavalry organization) consists of from
62 to 190 soldiers and is commanded by a captain, and a platoon consists of 16 to 44
soldiers and is led by a lieutenant. 
of its recent restructuring plan” which was approved by the Secretary of Defense.25
Officials suggest that the primary reason that the FCS program might be considered
is because “there’s a lot of money in FCS,” — estimated at $157 billion for research,
development and procurement through 2022.26  Some analysts suggest that despite
FCS’s “protected position,” its large price tag might make it vulnerable to budget
cuts resulting from the QDR.
The FCS Program
Program Overview 27
The Army describes the proposed FCS as a joint (involving the other services)
networked “system of systems.” FCS systems are to be connected by means of an
advanced network architecture that would permit connectivity with other services,
situational awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations that are
currently unachievable by Army combat forces.  FCS is intended to network with
existing forces, systems currently in development, and systems that will be developed
in the future. The FCS is to be incorporated into the Army’s brigade-sized modular
force structure.
FCS would include the following:
! Unattended ground sensors (UGS);
! Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) and Intelligent
Munitions System (IMS);
! Four classes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which will be
organic to platoon, company, battalion,28 and other echelons;
! Three classes of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs): the Armed
Robotic Vehicle (ARV), the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(SUGV),and the Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment
Vehicle (MULE);
! Eight types of manned ground vehicles;
! The network, and
! The individual soldier and his personal equipment and weapons.
CRS-7
29  See previous footnote for organizational definitions.
30 “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms,” Defense Acquisition University,
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 11th  Ed., Sept. 2003, pp. B-136 - B-137.
31 GAO-03-1010R, Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat System, Apr. 2003, p. 39.
32 Sec. 8109 of Report 108-622, Conference Committee Report, FY2005 Defense
Appropriations, July 20, 2004, requires the Army to field the Non Line of Sight Cannon
(NLOS-C) and its resupply vehicle by 2010 as well as deliver 8 combat operational
preproduction NLOS-C systems by the end of CY2008.
The FCS is to serve as the core building block of the Army’s Future Force. FCS-
equipped UAs (brigades) are to consist of:
! Three FCS-equipped Combined Arms Battalions29 (CABs); 
! One Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon battalion;
! One Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
squadron;
! One Forward Support battalion (FSB);
! One Brigade Intelligence and Communications company (BICC),
and
! One Headquarters company.
For a more detailed description of FCS subsystems, see Appendix A. 
FCS Program Timeline
FCS is currently in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase
of the Defense Acquisition System Life Cycle. The SDD phase is the third life cycle
phase which focuses on reducing integration and manufacturing risk, ensuring
operational supportability, and demonstrating the system through prototypes or
engineering development models.30  FCS entered the SDD phase in May 2003 despite
GAO warnings that the program was entering the phase with “more risk than
recommended by best practices or DOD guidance.”31
On July 21, 2004, the Army announced a major restructuring of the FCS
program. Some have maintained that this restructuring was intended to address the
risks and other issues raised by external agencies such as GAO. The primary
objectives of the restructuring included 
! Fielding FCS technologies to the current force in four discrete
“spirals’ starting in FY2008;
! Address Congressional language on the Non Line of Sight Cannon
(NLOS-C);32
! Field all 18 systems (only 14 were funded under previous program);
! Increase schedule by four years; and
! Designate an evaluation brigade to test spiraled FCS capabilities.
CRS-8
Restructured Program.  At present, the FCS program is operating under the
schedule depicted below:
Restructured FCS Program Schedule
Event Date (FY) Event Description
Milestone B Update May 2005 Milestone B approves entry into System




2008 A technical review to evaluate the progress
and technical adequacy of each major program
item.  It also examines compatibility with
performance and engineering requirements. 
(Part of SDD Phase)
Critical Design
Review
2010 A technical review to determine if the detailed
design satisfies performance and engineering
requirements.  Also determines compatibility
between equipment, computers, and personnel. 
Assesses producibility and program risk areas. 
(Part of SDD Phase).
Design Readiness
Review
2011 Evaluates design maturity, based on the
number of successfully completed system and
subsystem design reviews.  (Part of SDD
Phase).
Milestone C 2012 Milestone C approves the program’s entry into
the Production and Deployment (P&D) Phase. 
The P&D Phase consists of two efforts - Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate
Production and Deployment (FRP&D).  The
purpose of the P&D Phase is to achieve an




2015 IOC is defined as the first attainment of the
capability to employ the system as
intended.(Part of the P&D Phase).
Full Operational
Capability
2017 The full attainment of the capability to employ
the system, including a fully manned,
equipped, trained, and logistically supported
force.(Part of the P&D Phase).
Note: Event descriptions in this table are taken from the Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms
Glossary published by the Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 11th Ed., Sept. 2003.
While GAO acknowledges that the restructured program is an improvement, it
still believes that the FCS program is “at significant risk for not delivering planned
capability within budgeted resources,” primarily due to the program’s technical
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challenges and low level of demonstrated knowledge.33  One of GAO’s concerns is
that under the current program schedule, the actual performance of the completely
integrated  FCS  will be demonstrated very late in the program and could result a
significant cost increase.  According to GAO, the Critical Design Review ideally
should occur in the FCS program in 2008 in order to “confirm that the design is
stable enough to build production representative prototypes for testing.”34  GAO
notes that the FCS Critical  Design Review instead occurs in 2010 which is only two
years before the Army decides on whether or not to enter into production and that the
Army does not expect to conduct a preliminary demonstration of all the elements of
FCS until sometime in 2013 — one year after the production decision.35 GAO
maintains that the Army’s current program schedule makes FCS susceptible to “late
cycle churn” whereby  problems discovered through testing late in a product’s
development cycle result in  significant investments in additional time, effort, and
funds to overcome the  problem — a phenomenon that GAO notes “is a fairly
common occurrence” in DOD programs.36
FCS Program Budget
The FCS program budget has risen steadily since the program’s inception in
1999 as the program has evolved.  According to the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), “Because the FCS program is still in the early stages of development, its full
costs are not yet known.”37  Despite this ambiguity, CBO reports  that “the costs from
2006 through 2020 to develop and purchase the first increment, which would equip
15 — or about one-third — of the active Army’s combat brigades, could approach
$90 billion.”  This $90 billion price tag would make FCS the largest and most
expensive program in Army history.  Others suggest that FCS research and
development and procurement costs through 2022 could run as high as $157 billion.38
The DOD FY2006 budget request calls for $3.4 billion dollars for research,
development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E).39  This is an increase from $1.68
billion in FY 04 and $3.2 billion in FY 05.40
Independent program costs estimates from the Army and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group are due at Milestone B
Update in May 2005, but GAO notes that past and current program cost estimates do
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not include the costs of some 157 complementary programs — some of which, like
the JTRS and WIN-T programs (expected to cost around $35 billion combined), are
substantial.41  Program delays could further add to total program costs, with GAO
suggesting that a one year delay late in the FCS development cycle could cost over
$3 billion.42
Spiraling
“Spiraling” or Spiral Development is defined as a process in which:
A desired capability is identified, but the end-state requirements are not
known at program initiation. Requirements are refined through
demonstration, risk management and continuous user feedback. Each
increment provides the best possible capability, but the requirements for
future increments depend on user feedback and technology maturation.43
As previously noted, the restructured FCS program consists of four “spirals” that are
to introduce FCS technologies and systems to the current force.  These fielding
spirals are slated to occur in 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 and the Army plans to field
its second fully-equipped FCS brigade by 2015 and two more each year after 2015,
up to a total of  15 FCS-equipped brigades.  The primary reason cited for the
adoption of spiraling by the Army is to increase the chances of program success
which had been criticized by a variety of individuals and organizations —
 particularly GAO.  According to General Schoomaker, prior to spiraling, the FCS
program had only a 28 percent chance of success but, with spiraling, had in excess
of a 70 percent chance of success.44  It is not clear how the Army defines program
success, nor what methodology was used to determine the percentage chances of
success.  The Army also reportedly adopted spiraling to get relevant technologies into
the hands of soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as they became
available as opposed to letting them sit on the shelf until they could be integrated into
other systems.  
Critics of spiraling note that full completion of the FCS  program was delayed
four years due to this decision and the overall program costs were increased by an
estimated $ 28 billion.45  Those who are supportive of spiraling believe that in
addition to getting technologies to warfighters more quickly, spiraling will help to
reduce risk by permitting technologies to “mature” through additional development
and testing and that the overall program will benefit by the Army’s plan to establish
a dedicated test brigade — to be stood up in 2006 — to serve as the overall FCS field
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evaluation force.46  Major equipment and technologies currently planned to be fielded
to the FCS evaluation brigade during the spirals includes the following:47
! Spiral 1 (2008): System-of-Systems Common Operating
Environment (SOSCOE); Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS); Non
Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS); Intelligent Munitions
System (IMS); Non Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) pre-production
model;
! Spiral 2 (2010): SOSCOE Update; Unmanned Ground Vehicles
(UGV); Battle Command (BC)  system components;
! Spiral 3 (2012): SOSCOE Update; Battle Command (BC) system
components, communications relays for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs); and
! Spiral 4 (2014): Network Update; remaining Battle Command
system; all remaining FCS systems, all remaining Manned Ground
Vehicles (MGVs).
It is important to note that these spiral dates are dates when these systems are
fielded to the FCS evaluation brigade — not units in the field.  As envisioned, the
FCS evaluation brigade will test and evaluate these items for two years before they
are given to units in the field.48  Therefore Spiral 1 systems will reach units in the
field in 2010; Spiral 2 in 2012; Spiral 3 in 2014; and Spiral 4 in 2016.
Program Management
Some maintain that one of the most controversial aspects of the FCS program
is  its management.  As previously noted, in March 2002, the Army chose Boeing and
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to serve as lead system
integrators (LSI) for the FCS program.  Under this arrangement, Boeing is the prime
contractor and SAIC is working as a subcontractor to Boeing. Both companies could
reportedly be paid a total of almost $15 billion for their role in the program’s
management.49  Boeing and SAIC oversee the program, and they also select other
defense contractors to supply the program’s technologies and systems.  According
to an August 26, 2004 Army briefing — aside from Boeing and SAIC — 16 defense
contractors located in 29 states and 106 congressional districts were developing
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systems and technologies for the FCS program, and the number of defense
contractors was expected to grow over the program’s duration.50
Despite having a dedicated Acquisition Corps who receive advanced education
and certification to manage research and procurement programs, the Army opted for
the LSI program management model from the outset of the FCS program.  While the
LSI concept has come under criticism from a variety of sources, the Army likely had
little choice.  While the Army has publicly acknowledged the complexity of the FCS
program as a reason for choosing an LSI management approach, Army officials also
suggested  the Army does not have sufficient military or Department of the Army
Civilian (DAC) scientists, engineers and technical managers to adequately manage
all aspects of the FCS program.51  Some suggest that this problem is not just an Army
problem but DOD-wide.  One report maintains that DOD needs to hire more than
14,000 scientists and engineers in 2005 to fill new and vacated positions, which
could prove to be a difficult if not impossible task.52  The primary reasons cited for
this potential difficulty are 1) more than half of  the science and engineering
graduates from American universities are foreign nationals who are supposedly “off
limits”53 to federal agencies; 2) a declining number of students entering the science
and engineering fields; and 3) stiff competition from the private sector for these
graduates.54
Criticisms of the Lead System Integrator Approach.  The two main
criticisms of the lead system integrator approach are the Army’s potential lack of
control over the program and Boeing’s past ethical difficulties.  Some critics contend
that Boeing has too much authority in choosing which subcontractors will  build FCS
components as well as how much these subcontractors will be paid.55 Some fear that
the Army will assume a secondary role in the program and lose program expertise,
thereby making itself less capable of adequate oversight of Boeing’s operations.56
Boeing’s past ethical problems in its dealings with DOD — e.g., the Air Force tanker
lease scandal, an ongoing investigation over misappropriation of Lockheed Martin
Corporation documents during a 1990s missile competition, and Boeing’s disbarment
by the Air Force from competing for space contracts57 — have also been a source of
criticism.
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(continued...)
 According to Army officials, the Army has its personnel involved with Boeing
staffers at “every key point in the FCS program.”58  In addition, the Army has been
receptive to the involvement of other government agencies in the program such as
GAO and the Army notes that “multiple audits of FCS [are] ongoing at all times.”59
The Army reportedly plans to increase the use of the LSI approach in the future.60
According to a senior Army acquisition official, much of the Army’s systems
engineering expertise has “evaporated” and the Army must “outsource this
engineering.”61
Other Transactions Authority (OTA). The FCS program is being
administered under an Other Transactions Authority (OTA) arrangement.  The
Army’s use of OTA has been the subject of much criticism and  has raised concerns
in Congress.62  OTA was established by Congress under Section 845 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 (10 U.S.C. Section 2371) for research,
development, and prototyping, and was intended to permit the government to more
readily interact with innovative companies who are not part of the traditional defense
contracting community.  OTA provides the government with the flexibility  to
negotiate tailored contracts that are not governed by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR).  As originally enacted, OTA was intended for  companies that
may not have the staff or resources to operate under the FAR which has numerous
administrative and reporting requirements that may be beyond the capability of
smaller companies. Based in part on Congressional concern, the Army has recently
decided to restructure the FCS program under a FAR-based contract.63
Critics of  OTA use for the FCS program argued that the OTA does not afford
the government the protection that  contracts provide, gives too much authority to the
LSI team, does not provide sufficient opportunities for oversight, and does not have
the type of strict cost accountability mechanisms found in traditional contracts.64
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Critics also suggested that OTA use in the FCS program violated the intent of the
OTA and that companies such as Boeing, SAIC, and many of the FCS subcontractors
such as General Dynamics, United Defense, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and
Northrop Grumman are more than capable to operate within the Federal Acquisition
Regulation under a traditional contract.
The Army argued that the use of an OTA is necessary “because it did not have
the resources or flexibility to use its traditional acquisition process to field a program
as complex as FCS under the aggressive timeline established by the then-Army Chief
of Staff [General Shinseki].”65  While the Army was criticized for violating the
“intent” of the OTA, DOD reportedly has a history of similar use for OTA.
According to one report, between 1994 and 1998, 75 percent of the contractors using
OTA were traditional defense companies or nonprofit universities and
organizations.66  OTA is also widely used in the Ballistic Missile Defense Program
 — a program arguably as technically challenging and complex as the FCS program
 — with Boeing and Lockheed-Martin reportedly receiving more the $46 billion
worth of missile defense contracts under the OTA.67
The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)68 Report on FCS
Management.  While a variety of reviews and studies have been and continue to
be done on the FCS program, the IDA Review of FCS Management, published in
August 2004, is considered by some as one of the most comprehensive.  The study
 — requested by DOD and the Army — was asked to examine the FCS program
structure, practices, and contracting.  The study’s major findings are summarized as
follows:69
! “The Army-Boeing agreement does not anticipate future rounds of
competition for FCS systems or components as the program
transitions to production.  Nor does it appear that the current
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agreement provides the Army access to technical information
sufficient to enable future rounds of competition.”
! “The  Army-Boeing Agreement, although based on Other
Transactions Authority, incorporates numerous standard defense
contracting clauses, including termination rights, disputes resolution,
cost accounting, and auditing, that are commonly viewed as
protecting the government’s interests. The Army’s and Boeing’s
conservative approach in creating this agreement diffuses concern
that the use of an agreement based on OT authority has created
special risks for the FCS program.”
! “One intended benefit of the OTA — attracting non-traditional
suppliers — has not been realized to date; the initial rounds of
subcontracts has gone almost exclusively to traditional defense
suppliers.  And, their subcontractors employ standard Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and DFARS (Defense FAR
Supplement) formats and clauses.”
! “The Army will need to demonstrate a business case for OTA prior
to Congressional action to expand its applicability to the production
phase of FCS.  Building this case remains an uphill battle, given the
Army’s conservative use of OTA for the System Design and
Development phase, the fact that the program involves almost
exclusively traditional defense contractors, and Boeing’s use of
FAR-styled contracts for Tier I subcontractors.”
! “Boeing is taking demonstrable steps to “recapture the trust of its
customers” following disclosure of its prior ethics violations on
matters unrelated to FCS: they have commissioned independent
external reviews, and are strengthening their corporate structures and
policies.  Formal ethics programs, whether in the government or
industry, cannot guarantee that every individual who participates in
the FCS program will behave appropriately; sound policies, attention
to execution, and continued vigilance, however, can help to reduce
the likelihood of inappropriate behavior or violation of law.”
The Army contends that many of IDA’s recommendations had been
implemented by the time the report was made public.70  Some maintain that the report
found few problems with Boeing’s performance so far, noting Boeing’s efforts to
prevent further ethical transgressions, and suggested that the Army adopt a “trust but
verify” approach with Boeing.71  In addition, the IDA report suggests that the OTA
does not necessarily put the FCS program at risk as some have suggested, and  that
“there may be a savings in time and administrative costs in continuing with an OTA
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agreement into the production phase”, although FAR-based contracts have a more
substantial legal base to draw on.72  Given the degree of disparity concerning the
benefits and drawback to both the  LSI and OTA approaches, it is likely that
additional analysis will be required to aid both DOD and Congressional decision
makers concerning contractual options as the FCS program approaches the
production phase.
Program Developmental Issues
While Army officials have testified to Congress that the FCS program is “on
schedule, on cost, and on performance,”73 a number of program developmental issues
have been identified which could potentially change that assessment.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)74
On January 18, 2005, the Army reportedly issued a partial stop-work order and
halted the production of the engineering development models as well as low rate
initial production of the JTRS Cluster One radios.  JTRS Cluster One radios are
software-defined radios that are to be used to provide voice, video, and data
communications to ground and aerial vehicles.  One of the touted primary benefits
of JTRS is that it is being designed so that it can operate on multiple radio
frequencies, permitting it to talk to certain non-JTRS radios that are expected to stay
in the Army’s inventory.  Under the original program schedule, Boeing75 — the
program’s lead contractor — was scheduled to begin low rate initial production
(LRIP) in the third quarter of FY2005 and would equip its first unit with Cluster One
radios in FY2007.  JTRS is a joint program and therefore  not considered part of the
FCS program by the Army but it is to form the “backbone” of the FCS Network and
therefore it is of critical importance to the program’s success. According to one
report, the Pentagon has warned Boeing that it might terminate Boeing’s Cluster One
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contract reportedly due to “Boeing’s anticipated failure to meet cost, schedule and
performance requirements.”76
The Army’s decision to issue the partial stop-work order (the Defense
Acquisition Board is to conduct a review in August 2005 to determine if the partial
work stoppage should be lifted or continued) was reportedly based on a variety of
factors including difficulties with the system memory and security concerns.
According to an Army official, changing baseline requirements for the system as well
as a need to interface with the Defense Department’s Global Information Grid77
“aggravated an already extremely complex set of interdependencies that ultimately
require adjustment.”  According to GAO testimony, the Army has proposed delaying
Cluster One development by two years and adding $458 million to the development
effort.78
Of critical concern is the impact of the JTRS delay on FCS core programs.
Unmanned aerial vehicle contractors have predicated their production schedules on
Cluster One’s fielding and the stop-work order will likely have a significant  impact
in terms of time and money.  In addition, the fielding of Cluster One had previously
been scheduled to support FCS Spiral 1 in FY2008.  Because of these concerns, as
well as the impact of the delay of Cluster One on the other services, the Joint Staff
will reportedly review the entire JTRS program, in part to determine how the work
stoppage will affect FCS and other program’s developmental timelines.  GAO also
has suggested that Cluster Five radios — radios for dismounted soldiers and weight-
constrained platforms — are not likely to be available for FCS Spiral 1 fielding
either, due to technological challenges, as well as a delay in the program’s start due
to a contract bid.79
DOD reportedly will revamp  its JTRS management structure.  Instead of having
a separate program manager for each cluster, sources say, a single program manager
will oversee  development of all the clusters.  Congress in Section 213 of Report 108-
354, the Conference Report for The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004,
H.R. 1588, P.L. 108-136 called for the Department of Defense to “adopt a program
management structure that provides strong and effective joint management’ for the
JTRS program.  The Army has also reportedly narrowed its scope regarding JTRS.
The Army originally intended for JTRS to essential be a “radio replacement”
program for the Army.  The Army is to instead field sufficient JTRS systems to
enhance the network as required and then eventually replace current radios with
JTRS as current radios wear out over time.  Army officials note that sufficient
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resources do not exist to replace all current radios with JTRS and that it could not
afford to throw away good existing technology [current radios not necessarily FCS
compatible] just for the sake of replacing them with JTRS.
Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV)
MGV Transportability.  The MGV program is currently facing a major
technological challenge concerning its air transportability.  It has been widely
reported that one of the Army’s seven key performance parameters (KPP)80 for
MGVs is that they be transportable by the Air Force’s C-130 transport aircraft.81  This
is not the case, however, as the Army notes that the MGV C-130 transport issue is
not a KPP but instead a Critical Operational Issue and Criteria (COIC) which is a far
less stringent requirement.82  In general, in order to meet this criteria, the MGVs must
first be capable of fitting inside of the C-130 — leaving at least one foot of space
between the vehicle and the sides of the aircraft to permit emergency exit of the
aircraft — and the MGV can weigh no more than 20 tons.83
Reports suggest that, to date, the best that industry has been to do in terms of
MGV weight is more than 24 tons.84  In order to meet the C-130 weight limit, this
vehicle would need to be “stripped down” and it would require four to six hours per
vehicle to reconfigure them with fuel, ammunition, and other supplies — which is
significantly longer than the operational requirement that MGVs be converted to its
combat configuration no more than 30 minutes after rolling off a C-130.85  In
addition, a second C-130 aircraft would be required for each MGV to carry the
components and ammunition that had been stripped off the MGV so that it could
meet the 20 ton limit. 86  According to one Army official, this would “add hours to
intra-theater deployment times and tax the service’s logistics tail because it would
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significantly increase the number of sorties to move the force.”87  The Army is also
doubtful that even at the heavier 24 tons, that most of the MGV variants will meet
the Army’s survivability requirements.88  One solution to meet the C-130 weight and
size constraints would be to develop lightweight  composite armor which many
consider not only extremely costly but also technologically challenging .89
There have been a number of reports suggesting that the Army is considering
eliminating the MGV weight ceiling and that this issue is causing a rift between the
development community and officials who fear that engineering MGVs to meet
weight and size constraints could become cost prohibitive.90  Aside from the
transportability issue, some note that there are additional benefits to keeping the
MGVs to less than 20 tons.  Experts note that at 20 tons, MGVs should be able to
move through narrow streets in urban areas as well as move across most
bridges.91Another expert suggests that if the MGV weight ceiling that is required for
transport on C-130s is eliminated, other constraints could possibly be removed or
relaxed and that the MGVs could become too bulky or heavy for all but special
transport — not unlike the Army’s Crusader artillery system which was cancelled
because it no longer fit the Army’s transformation requirements.92
MGV Engines.  On December 14, 2004, the contract for the MGV engine was
delayed indefinitely — marking  the fourth contract delay since requests for proposals
(RFPs) were first issued in October 2003.93  The decision to delay the contract was
reportedly based on the Army’s desire to increase engine power from a 410 kilowatt
power rating to a 440 kilowatt power rating in order to power heavier vehicles.94
Decisions concerning where the engine will be placed in the MGV as well as whether
or not it will be a hybrid-electric engine or a mechanical engine have yet to be
made.95  If the Army is to meet the congressionally mandated deadline for the NLOS
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prototype, a contract decision will be needed soon to allow for production of long-
lead components.96
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)97
The Pentagon’s Director of Operational Testing & Evaluation (DOT&E)98
reportedly has expressed concern that the Army is likely to face difficulties in
creating large UGVs that can keep up with ground troops and respond to unexpected
circumstances.  While versions of lighter UGVs have been used successfully in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, DOT&E maintains that the medium and heavy classes of
UGVs will face greater technical challenges.  The medium class includes the Multi
Functional Utility Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE) and its variants while
the heavy UGV class includes the two Armed Robotic Vehicles (ARVs).  The Army
reportedly plans to build about 1,200 MULEs and about 675 ARVs, and both are
planned to be introduced in Spiral 2 in 2010.
According to DOT&E, early versions of the medium and heavy UGVs have
shown difficulty in responding to unexpected situations such as communications
failure or when the UGVs need to extract themselves from dangerous situations.  In
addition, these UGVs have difficulties with situational awareness as well as avoiding
fratricide.  UGV mobility is also proving to be an issue of concern.  In March 2004,
DARPA sponsored a UGV race — Grand Challenge — in the Mojave Desert but
none of the contestants were able to complete the 142 mile course.  DARPA has
reportedly scheduled a second Grand Challenge for October 8, 2005. 
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Issues for Congress
Is the FCS Relevant to Current and Future Security
Challenges?
The Army has characterized the FCS as the core building block of its Future
Force.99  FCS-equipped Units of Action are intended to be the Army’s future tactical
warfighting echelon optimized for offensive action.100 The Army has also stated that
FCS-equipped Units of Action will have the ability to execute a full spectrum of
operations and will improve the strategic deployability and operational maneuver
capability without sacrificing lethality or survivability. 
Outside of these statements, some suggest that the Army offers little to back up
these assertions.  The Army has not yet publically released even preliminary
operational doctrine for FCS-equipped units. Professional journals, such as the Army
War College’s Parameters and the Command and General Staff College’s Military
Review, are almost devoid of essays or articles discussing how FCS-equipped units
might be used in operations ranging from counterinsurgency to force-on-force
operations. While some maintain that the Army does not know how FCS will be used
operationally, an argument can be made that because FCS is so revolutionary in
design and capability, that any attempts to develop doctrine or operational concepts
at this early stage of the system’s design would be speculative at best.
Some, both inside and outside the military, have questioned the relevancy of
FCS in the current and future geostrategic environment.  In Relevancy and Risk: The
U.S. Army and Future Combat System,101 the authors recommend that initial versions
of the FCS be developed for low intensity conflicts, and,  as technology matures, new
FCS versions for high intensity combat. In making their case, Mait and Grossman
offer the following:
!   “That by relying upon a mobile, light, and distributed force
structure, the Army is subjecting itself to far too many dangerous
situations where large-scale heavy forces will be required. Lethal
technologies and precision weaponry, while effective, may still
prove incapable of defending the light weight platforms of the FCS
against a determined enemy.”102
! “The Army ... may be walking into a strategic ambush. Critics are
concerned that the new Army (FCS-equipped) will lack the staying
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power to survive in faraway places where ... it must fight in
situations where it is vastly outnumbered and distant from viable
reinforcements.”103
In An Alternative Future Force: Building a Better Army,104 the authors suggest
that:
! “Only three plausible MCO (major combat operation)- type
opponents come readily to mind: China, Iran, and North Korea.
China is a special case, with much more military power than any
other plausible opponent; U.S. decisionmakers would be extremely
wary about trading blows with China, especially with American
ground forces.”
! “Given the emergence of future MCO-class military opponents that
are armed with nuclear weapons, a major issue is whether the key
sensors and communications systems associated with the next
generation of reconnaissance-strike and battlefield situational
awareness systems will have to be made resistant to wide-area
electromagnetic effects generated by high-altitude nuclear weapon
use.”
! “One important lesson learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom is that
existing U.S. military forces are more than adequate for major
combat operations in a non-nuclear environment against forces with
second-tier technology and questionable quality.”
! “The homogeneous Objective Force (now known as the Future
Force), optimized for major combat operations, is not appropriate for
the vast majority of lesser operations the Army will likely be called
upon to execute in the coming decade or more. These more probable
operations will be at the mid-to-low end of the conflict spectrum,
analogous to post-Cold War operations in Somalia, Rwanda,
Kosovo, Bosnia, and the occupation phases of Afghanistan and Iraq
that are a part of the global war on terrorism.” 
Given these and other factors, the authors suggest that FCS “should be
redirected to become a program designed not to produce a family of universal
fighting vehicles for the entire Army, but as a technology enabling program to inject
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new capabilities into a modernizing family of light, medium, and heavy combat
systems.”105
Analysts outside of the military have also questioned the relevance of FCS.
According to the executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessment, Andrew Krepinevich, the FCS “may be revolutionary but it may not be
relevant.”106 Krepinevich reportedly considers that the underlying focus of the FCS
is on “ fighting a conventional enemy in what the Army calls an open battle” and
the problem with this is that the Army will likely not face this situation for “some
time.” 107 In addition, he offers the following observations:108
! “The conceptual documents behind the FCS and the Army future
force don’t contain much on urban warfare, stability operations,
counterinsurgency, and other threats that the Army is dealing with.”
! “The Army teamed with the Air Force may already provide much of
the capabilities promised by FCS.”
! “The program is still “woefully short of the bandwidth109 required”
for FCS systems such as JTRS and the Warfighter Tactical
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).”
Given these and other considerations, Congress may decide to examine FCS
relevancy in greater detail.  While few question the relevancy of FCS in  force-on-
force combat, as well as the demonstrated ability of current non FCS-equipped forces
to defeat such adversaries, there are numerous questions concerning the relevancy of
FCS at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.  It is possible that Congress might
explore these issues in greater depth not only with the Army, but also with the other
Services and other defense and non-defense institutions.  Such an examination could
help the Army clarify and explain FCS’s relevancy in lower spectrum of conflict
operations or, in instances where a deficiency is noted, suggest appropriate corrective
actions.
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Is the FCS Program, as Currently Envisioned, Viable?
Congress might act to review the overall viability of the FCS program as
currently envisioned by the Army — 15 FCS-equipped Units of Action, with the first
brigade fielded in 2014 with two FCS-equipped Units of Action fielded each year
after 2015. While the Army has stated that the program is  “on schedule, on cost. and
on performance,”110 many have questioned the program’s viability in terms of overall
risk, performance to date, and ambiguity concerning the program’s overall cost.
From its inception, the FCS program has been acknowledged by the Army as a
high risk program.  While some suggest a less risky approach, others note that with
the lack of a peer competitor and the U.S. Army’s proven dominance in land warfare,
the United States is in a position to embark on such a high risk venture which, if
successful,  could significantly enhance our future national security. While this
argument has merit, critics note that the cost of failure, although not likely to
endanger our national security, could come with a significant price tag as well as
forcing the Army in the next decade to develop a replacement system for the FCS.
GAO has been involved with the FCS program extensively and has been asked
to assess the prospects for delivering FCS within cost and scheduled objectives. In
recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Airland, GAO
found the following:
FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within budgeted
resources. Currently, about 9 1/2 years are allowed from development start to
production decision. DOD typically needs this period of time to develop a single
advanced system, yet FCS is far greater in scope. The program’s level of
knowledge is far below that suggested by best practices or DOD policy: Nearly
2 years after program launch and with $4.6 billion invested, requirements are not
firm and only 1 of over 50 technologies is mature. As planned, the program will
attain the level of knowledge in 2008 that it should have had in 2003. But things
are not going as planned. Progress in critical areas — such as network, software,
and requirements — has, in fact been slower, and FCS is therefore likely to
encounter problems late in development, when they are very costly to correct.
Given the scope of the program, the impact of cost growth could be dire.111
While these findings suggest that the FCS program may face significant future
challenges, these findings are by no means unique.  In a recent report to Congress
titled “Assessment of Selected Major Weapons Programs,” GAO assessed 54 DOD
programs including FCS, JTRS Cluster 1 and JTRS Cluster 5.112 In this report GAO
concluded that:
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The majority of programs that GAO assessed are costing more and taking longer
to develop than planned. Most of the programs proceeded with less knowledge
at critical junctures than suggested by best practices, although some programs
came close to meeting best practices standards. For example, the technology and
design for the F/A-22 matured late in the program contributing to a large cost
growth and scheduled delays.113
This being the case, some maintain that although the FCS program’s cost and
schedule will likely grow over time — as do the majority of DOD weapons programs
 — that the FCS program could still achieve its intended aims. 
Program performance to date, however, may suggest otherwise. As previously
discussed, JTRS, and Manned and Unmanned Ground Vehicle programs have been
suspended and delayed, not only impacting  these specific programs but also related
programs such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).  In addition, these and
additional challenges could have an impact on Spiral 1 fieldings and subsequent
testing by the FCS evaluation brigade. 
Program cost is another aspect of overall program viability. While total life
cycle FCS program costs have yet to be defined, GAO notes that research and
development costs have increased almost 51 percent from 2003 to 2004 and that
procurement costs are estimated to have increased by almost 32 percent.114  It is
unlikely that such a cost growth rate will be acceptable over the long-term. GAO’s
assessment that “the impact of cost growth could be dire” for the FCS program as
well as speculation that further program delays lay ahead, have some speculating that
a credible cost estimate for FCS and its complementary programs may be
unachievable with any degree of confidence.  With the Army under increasing
budgetary pressure to fund equipment recapitalization115, modularity efforts, and
possibly end-strength increases, some believe that it is inevitable that a financially
ill-defined FCS program would be the bill payer for these more immediate
operational requirements. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in its February
2005 Budget Options paper estimates that if the initial fielding date of the FCS was
delayed by four years, that  it would not only  permit immature technologies to
further develop,  but would also result in a program savings of about $ 7.5 billion
over five years.116 CBO further estimates that an outright FCS program cancellation
would save $ 71 billion over ten  years.117  Regarding the latter option, CBO cautions
that FCS program cancellation might, however, “preclude transforming the Army in
any meaningful way.”118
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FCS Program Management and Type of Contractual
Agreement
On April 6, 2005, it was reported that, based partially on Congressional
concerns,  the Army would restructure its OTA FCS contract to a more traditional
contract.119  While specific details of this change are still forthcoming, the Army did
report that any additional costs that will be incurred will likely be administrative in
nature.  Congress might opt to examine the Army’s proposed contract change in
detail, taking into consideration how it will impact the program’s budget and its
developmental timeline, as well as the Army’s ability to assume a greater role in
managing the FCS program.  Despite Army claims, some suggest that it is highly
unlikely that this contract and, ultimately, management restructuring will have no
effect on program timelines and budget. They argue that adding additional
administrative and oversight requirements and changing the program’s management
structure and philosophy could  have an impact both in terms of program structure,
scheduling, and its budget. Of particular concern is the Army’s ability to take on a
greater management role — particularly given that the Army was compelled to adopt
the Lead Systems Integrator approach at the program’s outset because it lacked
sufficient skilled program managers, scientists, and engineers.
Program “Off Ramps” and Integration Into the Current Force
Congress may decide to examine the FCS program’s “off ramps” in case the
overall program either fails to meet criteria to advance to the procurement phase or
if external circumstances — such as budget cuts — significantly modify or curtail the
program.  Many believe that FCS programs such as UAVs, UGS, UGVs, and aspects
of the Network could be migrated to the current Abrams/Bradley force successfully,
not only significantly enhancing the force’s capabilities, but also justifying FCS
program expenses occurred up to the point of migration.  The Army reportedly plans
to use M-1s and M-2s as surrogates in the FCS evaluation brigade until  MGVs  are
available for testing, which will also permit the Army to evaluate how these systems
could improve the current force’s performance.  Some suggest that such an “off
ramp” plan would be a prudent risk-mitigation action, given the numerous challenges
still facing the FCS program, as well as the program’s reported progress to date.
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Appendix A.  FCS Subsystems
Manned Ground Vehicles
FCS manned ground vehicles (MGVs) are a family of eight different prospective
combat vehicles — with some having more than one variation — that are based on
a common platform and are being designed to be transported by the U.S. Air Force’s
C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and deployed straight into combat with little or no
post-flight reconfiguration.120  They are to be equipped with a variety of passive and
active protection systems and sensors that the Army hopes will offer them the same
survivability as the current heavy armor force.121 Some believe that it will be difficult
for the Army to develop this family of vehicles that will weigh only 20 tons — the
weight limit for vehicles to be transported by current C-130s — and maintain the
same lethality and survivability as current armored fighting vehicles.122 In addition
the Army intends for its MGVs to be highly reliable, require low maintenance, and
have fuel-efficient engines.123 Some note that many of these requirements may
actually work against each other.  For example, new weapons systems could increase
the size and weight of the vehicles, possibly precluding their transport by C-130
aircraft.124  The following are brief descriptions of MGV types and variants and all
variants are intended to have a range of 750 kilometers and a top speed of 90
kilometers per hour (kph) — 55 miles per hour:125
Mounted Combat System (MCS). As envisioned, the MCS provides direct
and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) fires, is capable of providing direct fire support to
dismounted infantry, and can attack targets with BLOS fires out to a range of 8
kilometers. The MCS is intended to replace to current M-1 Abrams tank.  The MCS
is to have a crew of two and might also be able to accommodate two passengers. 
The MCS is to be armed with a 120 mm main gun, a .50 caliber machine gun, and
a 40 mm automatic grenade launcher.
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV).  As planned, the ICV consists of four
versions: the Company Commander version, the Platoon Leader verison, the Rifle
Squad version, and the Weapons Squad version. All four versions appear to be
identical from the exterior to prevent the targeting of a specific carrier version. The
Rifle Squad version is to have a two man crew and is to be able to transport a nine
man infantry squad and dismount them so that they can conduct combat operations
on foot. The ICV is to mount a 30 or 40 mm cannon. 
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Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C).  The NLOS-C is to provide
networked, extended-range targeting and precision attack of both point and area
targets with a wide variety of munitions.  Its primary purpose will be to provide
responsive fires to FCS Combined Arms Battalions and their subordinate units.  The
NLOS is to have a two man crew and  a fully automated handling, loading, and firing
capability. It is not yet known what caliber the NLOS-C’s cannon will be. 
Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M).  The NLOS-M is intended to provide
indirect fires in support of UA companies and platoons . The NLOS-M is to have a
four man crew, mount a 120mm mortar, and also carry an 81 mm mortar for
dismounted operations away from the carrier.   
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV).  As planned, the RSV
will feature advanced sensors to detect, locate, track, and identify targets from long
ranges under all climatic conditions, both day and night. The RSV is to have a mast-
mounted long-range, electro-optical infra-red sensor, sensors for radio frequency
(RF) intercept and direction finding as well as a remote chemical warfare agent
detector. RSVs are to also carry four dismounted scouts, unattended ground sensors
(UGS), a Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) with various payloads, and two
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In addition to the four scouts, the RSV is to
have a two man crew and a defensive weapons system. 
Command and Control Vehicle (C2V).  The C2V is intended to serve as
the “hub” for battlefield command and control.  It is to provide information
management for the integrated network of communications and sensors for the UAs.
The C2V is to have a crew of two and carry four staff officers and also be capable of
employing UAVs. 
Medical Vehicle - Evacuation (MV-E) and Medical Vehicle -
Treatment (MV-T).  There are to be two versions of the MV — the MV-E and MV-
T. The MV-E would permit combat trauma specialists to be closer to the casualty’s
point of injury as it is to move with combat forces and evacuate casualties to other
treatment facilities.  The MV-T is to enhance the ability to provide Advanced Trauma
Management/Advanced Trauma Life Support forward in the battle area and both
MV-E and MV-T would  be capable of conducting medical procedures and
treatments using telemedicine systems.  Both would have four man crews and the
capability to carry four patients.
FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV).  The FRMV would
be the Unit of Action’s recovery and maintenance system. The FRMV is to have a
crew of three, plus additional space for up to three recovered crew members.
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)126
Each FCS-equipped UA (brigade) is to have almost 200 UAVs ranging from
small, platoon-level vehicles to larger, higher endurance aircraft.127  While these
UAVs are to provide a variety of capabilities to forces on the ground, some experts
note that they could also present an air space management challenge to not only
manned Army aviation assets, but also to Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and other
nation’s aircraft that might be providing support to Army ground operations.  The
following are brief descriptions of the Army’s four classes of UAVs:
Class I UAVs.  Class I UAVs are intended to provide Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) at the platoon level. Weighing less than
15 pounds each, these Class I UAVs are intended to operate in urban and jungle
terrain and have a vertical takeoff and landing capability. They are to be used to
observe routes and targets and can provide limited communications transmissions
relay. The Class I UAV are to be controlled by dismounted soldiers and can also be
controlled by selected FCS ground platforms, and have an endurance of 50 minutes
over an 8 kilometer area, and a 10,500 foot maximum ceiling. 
Class II UAVs.  Class II UAVs are intended to provide RSTA at the company
level. The Class II UAV is to be vehicle mounted and have a vertical takeoff and
landing capability.  Its planned distinguishing capability is that it can designate
targets both day and night and in adverse weather at a distance of 2 kilometers from
the UAV, enabling the company commander to employ line-of-sight, BLOS, and
NLOS fires. It can also provide limited communications relays.  Class II UAVs are
intended to have an endurance of 120 minutes over a 16 kilometer area and an 11,000
foot maximum ceiling. 
Class III UAVs.  Class III UAVs are to be multifunctional systems intended
to be employed at the  battalion level. A Class III UAV  encompasses all capabilities
found in the Class I and II UAVs but are planned to also provide an enhanced
communications relay capability, mine detection, chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear detection, and meteorological survey.  The Class III UAV is to be able
to take off and land without a dedicated airfield and is intended to be able to stay
aloft for 6 hours over a 40 kilometer area with a maximum ceiling of 12,000 feet.
Class IV UAVs.  Class IV UAVs are intended to provide the UA (brigade)
commander with  a long endurance capability encompassing all functions in Class
I through Class III UAVs. It is intended to stay aloft for 72 continuous hours and
operate over a 75 kilometer radius with a maximum ceiling of 16,500 feet. It is also
planned to interface with other manned and unmanned aerial vehicles and be able to
take off and land without a dedicated airfield. 
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Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)128
Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV).  The ARV is intended to come in two
variants — the Assault variant and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition (RSTA) variant.  The two variants are to share a common chassis. The
Assault variant is to provide remote reconnaissance capability, deploy sensors, and
employ its direct fire weapons and special munitions at targets such as buildings,
bunkers, and tunnels.  It is also intended to be able to conduct battle damage
assessments, act as a communications relay, and support both mounted and
dismounted forces with direct and anti-tank fire as well as occupy key terrain.  The
RSTA version is to have similar capabilities but is not intended to provide direct
support fire to mounted or dismounted troops.
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV).  The SUGV is a small,
lightweight, manportable UGV capable of operating in urban terrain, tunnels, and
caves. The SUGV will weigh 30 pounds, can operate for 6 hours without a battery
recharge, and has a one kilometer ground range and a 200 meter tunnel range. Its
modular design will permit a variety of payloads which will enable it to perform
high-risk intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions and chemical
weapons or toxic industrial chemical  reconnaissance.
Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE).  The
MULE is a UGV that will support dismounted infantry. It is to come in three variants
sharing a common chassis-transport, countermine, and the Armed Robotic Vehicle -
Assault - Light (ARV-A-L). The transport variant is to be able to carry 1,900 to 2,400
pounds of equipment and rucksacks for dismounted infantry and follow them in
complex and rough terrain. The countermine variant is to have the capability to
detect, mark, and neutralize anti-tank mines. The ARV-A-L variant is to incorporate
a weapons package and a  RSTA package to support dismounted infantry operations.
The MULE is intended to have a 100 kilometer road, and 50 kilometer cross country,
range.
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)129
UGS are divided into two groups — Tactical UGS and Urban UGS — and are
described as follows:
Tactical UGS. Tactical UGS include intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) sensors.  These sensors are to employ a variety of sensing technologies and
integrated into the overall FCS network. They are intended to be designed to be
deployed by hand, by vehicle, or by robot and have a 48 hour endurance. These
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expendable, low-cost sensors can be used for such tasks as perimeter defense,
surveillance, target acquisition, and CBRN early warning.
Urban UGS.  Urban UGS can also be employed by soldiers, vehicles, or robots
and are intended to provide situation awareness inside and outside of buildings for
force protection and also for previously-cleared buildings and areas.
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) and Intelligent
Munitions System (IMS).
NLOS-LS.  NLOS-LS is to consist of a family of missiles in a deployable,
platform-independent, container launch unit (CLU), which can be fired in an
unmanned and remote mode. Each CLU is to have a fire control system and 15
missiles consisting of Precision Attack Missiles (PAM) and Loitering Attack
Missiles (LAM).
The PAM is to have two employment modes — a direct-fire and a fast attack
mode or a boost-glide mode. The missile is intended to receive target information
prior to launch and  receive and respond to target location updates while in flight.
The PAM can be fired in the laser-designated mode and  transmit near real-time
target imagery prior to impact. The PAM is intended to be used against heavily
armored targets.
The LAM is to provide imagery for search, surveillance, targeting, and battle
damage assessment (BDA) and can also serve as an airborne radio retransmission
sight. LAMs are to be capable of flying long distances with significant loiter times.
LAMs are intended to be re-programmed in flight and attack, high value, fleeting
targets. 
IMS.  IMS is intended to be an unattended munitions system, consisting of a
variety of lethal and non-lethal munitions and can be used for filling gaps, isolating
enemy forces or objectives, and controlling non-combatant movement with nonlethal
munitions. IMS is to have an on-off capability and can be recovered and re-employed
if not used. It can also self destruct if required and is to have an anti-tamper
capability.
The Network130
The FCS network is considered the most crucial system of all 18 systems and,
according to the CSA, General Schoomaker, “the toughest part of the program will
be assembling the network that ties the system of systems together.”131  The FCS
network is to consist of four interactive components — the System-of-Systems
Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE); Battle Command (BC) software;
communications and computers (CC); and intelligence, reconnaissance and
surveillance (ISR) systems. 
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132 The Joint Tactical Radio System program is not an FCS or Army -specific program but
instead is a joint service program. JTRS is unique in that it allows the radio’s capabilities
to be improved through software upgrades as opposed to developing and purchasing new
hardware.
System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE).
The SOSCOE is to enable the integration of a variety of software packages into the
FCS network. It is intended to use commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and allow for
the integration of critical interoperability packages that translate Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and  allied message formats into internal FCS message formats.
Battle Command (BC) Software.  Battle Command mission applications
are to include mission planning and preparation, situational understanding, battle
command and mission execution, and warfighter-machine interface.
Mission Planning and Preparation.  Consists of 16 different services that
provide FCS units with the following automated capabilities:
! The development of deliberate, anticipatory, and rapid-response
plans;
! The ability to perform plan assessments and evaluations;
! The ability to perform terrain analysis;
! The conduct of mission rehearsals; and
! The conduct of after action reviews.
Situation Understanding.  This consists of 10 different packages that allow
the user to better comprehend their surroundings. These packages employ map
information and a variety of databases that help to determine enemy locations and
capabilities, infer enemy intentions, and assess the threat to U.S. forces.
Battle Command and Execution.  This package contains a variety of
planning and decision aids to help commanders make rapid, informed, and accurate
decisions during battle. These packages can also be used in the training and rehearsal
modes.
Warfighter-Machine Interface Package.  This package receives soldier-
generated information and displays information across all FCS platforms for soldier
use.
Communications and Computer (CC) Systems.  The Communications
and Computer network is intended to provide secure, reliable access to information
over extended distances and complex terrain. This network is not intended to rely on
a large and separate infrastructure because it is to be embedded in the FCS mobile
platforms and  move with the combat units. The communications network is to
consist of a variety of systems such as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)132
Clusters 1 and 5 (Cluster 1 radios are for vehicles — Cluster 5 are for dismounted
soldiers and weight-constrained  platforms); Wideband Network Waveform and
Soldier Radio Waveform systems; Network Data Link; and the Warfighter
Information Network Tactical (WIN-T).
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Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) Systems.  The
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance System is to be a distributed and
networked array of multispectral ISR sensors intended to provide timely and accurate
situational awareness to the FCS force. In addition, the ISR system is intended to
help FCS formations avoid enemy fires while providing precision, networked fires
to the unit. 
The Soldier
All dismounted soldiers are to wear the Land Warrior combat ensemble which
includes enhanced body protection, an embedded computer/communication system,
and a family of new personal weapons.
